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I. INTRODUCTION
The Securities & Exchange Commission ("SEC" or "Commis-
sion"), through its Division of Enforcement, endeavors to preserve
the integrity of securities markets by enforcing the federal securities
laws in administrative proceedings and in federal courts. The Com-
mission relies heavily on professionals such as accountants and at-
torneys to ensure enforcement of and compliance with federal secur-
ities laws intended to protect the investing public.
For example, the role of the public accountant is viewed as cru-
cial to the effective functioning of securities laws. Accountants are
regulated by professional standards enumerated in Generally Ac-
cepted Accounting Principles ("GAAP") and Generally Accepted
Auditing Standards ("GAAS"). In addition, the SEC has actively
expanded its oversight of the accounting profession by instituting
administrative proceedings against accountants practicing before the
Commission, and by offering numerous guidelines in accounting and
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auditing enforcement releases.' Other forms of guidance provided
for accountants by the SEC include Financial Reporting Releases,
Codification of Financial Reporting Policies, and Staff Accounting
Bulletins.'
As the complexity of securities transactions has increased, the
importance of ensuring that ethical and competent attorneys prac-
tice before the Commission has also increased. Historically, the
practice of law has been regulated by the states through codes of
ethics' and model rules,4 in accordance with professional standards
and disciplinary bodies established by state bar associations. In the
absence of a federal regulatory body to discipline lawyers, the SEC,
through administrative adjudication and civil actions, has deemed it
necessary to address on its own the misconduct or negligence of at-
torneys who practice federal securities law.5
Unlike its approach to the accounting profession, the Commis-
sion has not set definitive standards for attorneys in the area of fed-
eral securities regulation. The lack of clear guidelines for attorneys
practicing securities law has been the cause of much conflict be-
tween the legal profession and the regulators. This conflict has
sparked a reevaluation of the scope of a securities lawyer's obliga-
tion to his client and to the investing public.6
See In re Portney, Accounting & Auditing Enforcement Release No. 242 [1987-
1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 73,711 (Aug. 21, 1989); In re Moore,
Accounting & Auditing Enforcement Release No. 264 [1987-1991 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. 73,733 (July 17, 1990); In re Excel Bancorp, Inc., Accounting Series Release
No. 316 [1987-1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 73,785 (Sept. 11, 1991);
In re Amre, Inc. & Walter W. Richardson, Accounting & Auditing Enforcement Release
No. 356 [1987-1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 73,823 (Mar. 2, 1992).
Special Report on Regulation of Accountants under Federal Securities Laws, Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) No. 1489, Part II (Mar. 14, 1992).
3 See Model Code of Professional Responsibility (1983).
See Model Rules of Professional Conduct (1991).
See In re Carter and Johnson, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
82,847 (Feb. 28, 1981) (SEC enumerated its standards for unethical or improper conduct
under Rule 2(e)); Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980) (Supreme Court held that scienter
must be shown in an action against attorneys under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and
Section 17(a)(1) of the Securities Act of 1933); SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp.,
457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978) (SEC imposed a "whistle blowing" duty on attorneys
whose clients' proposed conduct would violate the securities laws).
6 See Lincoln Savings & Loan Assoc. v. W. Danny Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901, 919-920
(D.D.C. 1990), where the district judge questioned the professional conduct of accountants
and attorneys of an insolvent financial institution.
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Despite much criticism from the legal community,7 the Com-
mission has attempted to hold attorneys accountable for unethical or
improper conduct that results in the violation of a securities law.
One of the SEC's most powerful enforcement tools is Section
15(c)(4) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange
Act").8 This provision authorizes the SEC to issue administrative
orders requiring compliance with disclosure sections 12, 13, 14, and
15(d) of the Exchange Act. Section 15(c)(4) provides that,
[i] f the Commission finds, after notice and opportunity for
a hearing, that any person subject to the provisions of sec-
tion 12, 13, 14, or subsection (d) of section 15 of this title
or any rule or regulation thereunder has failed to comply
with any such provision, rule or regulation in any material
respect, the Commission may publish its findings and issue
an order requiring such person, and any person who was a
cause of the failure to comply due to an act or omission
the person knew or should have known would contribute to
the failure to comply, to comply, or to take steps to effect
compliance, with such provision or such rule or regulation
thereunder upon such terms and conditions and within
such time as the Commission may specify in such order.9
Under Section 15(c)(4), an attorney can be cited for being the
"cause" of his client's failure to comply with any of the disclosure
provisions. The scope of Section 15(c)(4) was addressed in the Com-
mission's administrative proceeding against Wall Street attorney
George Kern, who was found to have "caused" his client, Allied
Stores Corporation, to violate disclosure requirements pertaining to
tender offer negotiations. 10 Although the Kern decision has been
viewed by legal professionals as an SEC failure, the fact that it
Report of the ABA's Section of Business Law Task Force on SEC Section 15(c)(4)
Proceedings, Bus. LAW., Vol. 46, Nov. 1990.
B 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o(c)(4) (West Supp. 1991).
1 Section 15(c)(4), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o(c)(4) (West Supp. 1991).
10 In re George C. Kern, Jr., [1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1
84,815 (June 21, 1991), aftd, [1988-1989] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 84,342 (Nov. 14
1988).
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highlights the Commission's current focus on the ethical conduct of
the legal profession has been overlooked.
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 15(cX4)
Section 15(c)(4) was enacted for the limited purpose of cor-
recting false filings. This section was designed to "establish an ad-
ministrative procedure ... for apprising investors of materially mis-
leading filings and for the resolution of accounting and other
complex and technical questions involving the disclosure provisions
of the [Exchange A]ct."' The statute was adopted by Congress in
the Securities Acts Amendments of 196412 to improve investor pro-
tection and solidify standards and controls over brokerage firms and
their associated persons. 3
In 1984, Section 15(c)(4) was amended in a provision of the
Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 ("ITSA")."' Specifically, the
amendment added Section 14 of the Exchange Act (proxy and
tender offer regulations) to the provisions that could be enforced
through Section 15(c)(4) administrative proceedings. Moreover, the
1984 amendment added new language permitting proceedings to be
brought against a person who was a "cause" of one of the enumer-
ated violations. As amended, Section 15(c)(4) allows the Commis-
sion to proceed against an individual who has contributed to a regu-
lated entity's reporting violation, even though that individual has no
direct compliance responsibilities pursuant to the Exchange Act.
III. ENFORCEMENT OF SECTION 15(cX4): THE KERN
CASE
In cases where the SEC has instituted proceedings against non-
regulated individuals for causing a violation pursuant to Section
15(c)(4), the individuals named have been directors, officers, or em-
11 S. Rep. No. 379, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1963). (Report of the Senate Committee
on Banking and Currency to Accompany S. 1642).
12 Pub. L. No. 88-467, § 6, 78 Stat. 565, 573 (1964).
18 Id.
14 Pub. L. No. 98-376, § 4, 98 Stat. 1265 (1984).
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ployees of the regulated entity. 15 In the Kern case, the lawyer was
also a director of the regulated entity. 6 Kern represents the first
time the SEC has suggested that attorneys may also be targeted
under Section 15(c)(4)."7
A. Facts
George C. Kern, Jr. ("Kern"), a reputable partner at Sullivan
& Cromwell who headed the mergers and acquisitions division of
the law firm, served as outside counsel to Allied Stores Corporation
("Allied"), a publicly traded corporation subject to the reporting re-
quirements of the Exchange Act. 8 On September 12, 1986, Allied
became the target of a hostile tender offer by Campeau Corporation
("Campeau"). 9 Allied's board of directors (including Kern) met on
September 23 to consider Campeau's offer. They resolved to explore
alternatives through an investment banking firm.2" The next day,
Allied made the following disclosure on Item 7(a) of its Schedule
14D-9, filed with the SEC on September 25, 1986:
At its September 23, 1986 meeting, the Board considered
and reviewed the feasibility and desirability of exploring
and investigating certain types of possible transactions, in-
cluding without limitation, a change in the present capital-
ization of the Company, the public or private sale of
Shares or other securities of the Company to another com-
pany or person, the acquisition by the Company of Shares
by tender offer of otherwise, the acquisition by the Com-
16 Report of the ABA's Section of Business Law Task Force on SEC Section 15(c)(4)
Proceedings, Bus. LAW., Vol. 46, November 1990.
" In re George C. Kern, Jr. [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
84,342, at 89,580.
" See In re George C. Kern, Jr. [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 84,342 (initial decision), and In re George C. Kern, Jr. [1991 Transfer Binder)
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,815 (the Commission's subsequent review), where Kern's
professional conduct in his role as outside counsel to Allied, not as director, was the focus of
the proceedings.
18 In re George C. Kern, Jr. [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
84,342, at 89,580.
1' Id. at 89,581.
20 Id.
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pany of all or part of the business of another company or
person, and the acquisition of the Company or of one or
more of its significant business segments or of certain of its
assets or a portion of its Shares by another company or
person. After considerable discussion, the Board resolved
that it was desirable and in the best interests of the Com-
pany and its stockholders to continue to explore and inves-
tigate, with the assistance and advice of Goldman Sachs,
such transactions, although the Board noted that the initi-
ation or continuation of such activities may be dependent
upon future actions with respect to the Offer. There can be
no assurance that these activities will result in any transac-
tion being recommended to the Board or that any transac-
tion which may be recommended will be authorized or
consummated. The proposal or consummation of any
transaction of the type referred to in this Item 7 may have
an impact on the Offer. At its September 23, 1986 meet-
ing, the Board also adopted a resolution with respect to the
need for confidentiality with respect to the parties to, and
possible terms of, any transactions or proposals of the type
referred to in the preceding portion of this Item 7 during
negotiations with respect to any such transactions. 2'
Allied, along with Kern, opened negotiations on September 26
with Edward J. DeBartolo Corporation ("DeBartolo") for the sale
of six shopping centers owned by Allied.22 At the end of the day, the
parties agreed on a price of $405 million for the malls, subject to a
report on their quality.23 During the course of the negotiations, Al-
lied's CEO understood that Kern, without consulting any of the of-
ficers of Allied, would make all decisions regarding any disclosures
required by federal securities laws.24
At this stage of the negotiations, Kern thought the agreement
reached with DeBartolo did not require disclosure because he be-
lieved it did not represent an agreement as to both the price and
21 Id. (Item 7(a), Schedule 14D-9, Solicitation/ Recommendation Statement Pursu-
ant to Section 14(d)(4) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, cited in the initial decision).
22 Id. at 89,581-89,582.
23 Id. at 89,582.
24 Id.
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structure of the sale.2 5 On September 29, Allied's sale of the malls
to DeBartolo was cancelled when Campeau increased his offering
bid. 26 Allied, represented by Kern, immediately commenced an ag-
gressive search for a "white knight." Allied approached DeBartolo
and began negotiations with that suitor on September 30.27 After
several meetings, on October 3 Allied and DeBartolo reached an
agreement in principle as to the price and structure of a merger. 8
That afternoon, Allied's Board of Directors adopted a resolution ap-
proving and recommending the merger, contingent on DeBartolo ob-
taining the necessary financing.29 Kern did not file an amendment to
Allied's Schedule 14D-9 until October 8, 1986,0 because he be-
lieved the transaction was uncertain until DeBartolo had secured the
financing for the purchase. 3'
On June 29, 1987, the Commission instituted administrative
proceedings under Section 15(c)(4) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 against Allied and Kern, ordering the initiation of public
proceedings to determine whether Allied failed to comply with Sec-
tion 14(d)(4) of the Exchange Act and Rule 14d-9 thereunder, and
whether Kern was a cause of Allied's failures to comply with said
provisions of the Exchange Act. 32 The SEC's Division of Enforce-
ment ("Division") alleged in the Order Instituting Proceedings
("Order") that Allied failed to promptly amend its September 24,
1986 Schedule 14D-9 to disclose the negotiations Allied engaged in
as a result of Campeau's tender offer.3" Additionally, the Order al-
leged that Kern made the decisions which resulted in Allied's fail-
ures to comply and was a cause of Allied's failures to comply with
the disclosure provisions of the Exchange Act.34
25 Id.
11 Id. at 89,584.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 89,586.
29 Id. at 89,586-89,587.
" Id. at 89,587.
1 Id.
Proceedings Instituted Against Allied Stores Corporation and George C. Kern, Jr.,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-24648, Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-6869, 38 SEC
Docket 987 (June 29, 1987).
33 Id.
84 Id.
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On July 22, 1987 the Commission accepted Allied's Offer of
Settlement, in which Allied consented to the Commission's Findings
and Order without admitting or denying the initial Order's allega-
tions.85 Allied was found to have violated Section 14(d)(4)36 of the
Exchange Act and Rule 14d-9 thereunder by failing to promptly
amend their Schedule 14D-9, and was directed to comply in all re-
spects with the Exchange Act.3 7 Simultaneously, the Commission
terminated the administrative proceeding with respect to Allied.38
B. The Initial Decision
Chief Administrative Law Judge Warren E. Blair held that
Kern was a "cause" of Allied's failure to comply with the disclo-
sures provisions of the Exchange Act. He concluded that Kern "ne-
glected to give due care and consideration to the need for amend-
ment of Allied's Schedule 14D-9 as material changes occurred"
since its original filing. 9 In substance, Judge Blair found that Allied
failed to promptly amend its Schedule 14D-9,40 and that Kern knew
or should have known that he was contributing to Allied's failure to
comply with Section 14 of the Exchange Act in three different
instances:
1) Allied's negotiations regarding the sale of its shopping
centers;
2) Allied's merger negotiations with DeBartolo; and
86 In re Allied Stores Corporation and George C. Kern, Jr., Exchange Act Release
No. 24727, 38 SEC Docket 1174 (July 22, 1987).
36 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n (West Supp. 1991). Section 14(d)(4) of the Exchange Act and
Rule 14d-9 thereunder, requires that no solicitation or recommendation to holders of a se-
curity shall be made with respect to a tender offer for such securities unless as soon as
practicable on the date of the solicitation or recommendation is first published or sent or
given to holders of a security, a Schedule 14D-9 (17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-101) is filed.
87 Id.
38 Id.
11 In re George C. Kern, Jr. [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
84,342, at 89,593.
40 Pursuant to Rule 14d-9(b), if any material change occurs in the information set
forth in Schedule 14D-9, an amendment on Schedule 14D-9 must be filed with the Commis-
sion disclosing such change promptly.
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3) Allied's agreement in principle with DeBartolo and
board resolution of October 3, 1986.41
In the initial decision, Allied's original disclosure in Schedule
14D-9 that its Board had "resolved that it was desirable and in the
best interest of the Company and its stockholders to continue to ex-
plore and investigate" certain recapitalization transactions, was
found to be deficient as to the disclosure of the September 25 nego-
tiations for the sale of the shopping malls. 42 Kern's counsel argued
that Kern exercised reasonable professional judgment in determin-
ing that these negotiations did not prompt further disclosures, since
there was no agreement on price and terms of the -sale on that date,
and that no material change had transpired from the time of the
initial filing. 43 Judge Blair acknowledged that no agreement in prin-
ciple as to the price and terms of the sale had been reached as of
September 25, but disagreed as to the materiality of the events."
In determining whether this event was material and would re-
quire disclosure thereof, the court cited the seminal case of Basic
Incorporated v. Levinson.4 In that case, the Supreme Court ratified
the use of the probability/magnitude balancing test enunciated in
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,4" and affirmed its prior decision in
TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc..4 It held that materiality
was determined by balancing the indicated probability that an event
will occur with the anticipated magnitude of the event in light of the
totality of the circumstances. 48 Kern argued that the probability of
the sale of the shopping centers was too remote on September 25,
since the deal was subject to DeBartolo's review of the malls' qual-
ity reports. 49 Nevertheless, Judge Blair weighed the probability that
the sale would be consummated with the magnitude of that event
41 Id. at 89,581-89,588.
42 Id. at 89,582.
43 Respondent's Brief at 51-52, Kern (No. 1174).
44 In re George C. Kern, Jr. [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1
84,342, at 89,582.
48 Basic Incorporated v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 108 S.Ct. 978 (1988).
48 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
47 TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
48 In re George C. Kern, Jr. [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
84,342, at 89,583.
49 Id.
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($405 million), and concluded that the "balance [lay] heavily on the
side of a finding of materiality and a need to disclose the negotia-
tions that transpired on September 25." 5o
Kern had also decided that no amendment to Schedule 14D-9
was necessary as to the merger negotiations with DeBartolo between
September 29 and October 3.51 It appears from the record that vari-
ous meetings took place during this period, in which significant
events occurred in Kern's presence which solidified DeBartolo's
tender offer. 52
At the hearing, Kern argued that his decision not to disclose
the merger negotiations as of October 3 was premised on the fact
that DeBartolo's obtaining financing for the deal was a condition
precedent to the merger.5" He contended that no agreement existed
that would prompt further disclosures since DeBartolo did not have
a firm financing commitment at this point. 54
Judge Blair opined that "by the close of October 2, 1986 a ma-
terial change in the information previously disclosed had occurred
and that the new developments would have been of significant inter-
est to Allied shareholders. ' 55 Given the fact that as of October 2 the
parties had a draft of the proposed merger reflecting their agree-
ment as to both the price and structure of the merger, the SEC's
Division of Enforcement ("Division") argued that there was a
strong probability that the merger would be consummated.56
Applying the materiality test set forth in Basic, Judge Blair
concurred with the Division's position and concluded that "the prob-
able effect of the negotiations was close to being of the first magni-
tude. '5 7 Kern was criticized for relying too heavily on the absence of
a firm financing commitment as a determining factor in the filing of
50 Id.
1 Id.
5 Id. at 89,584. During the relevant period, the parties discussed the price structure
of the deal, conducted reviews of confidential financial information, and directed their
outside counsel to prepare a merger agreement outlining the structure and timing of the
offer.
Respondent's Brief at 53-54, Kern (No. 1174).
In re George C. Kern, Jr. [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH)
84,342, at 89,585.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id.
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an Amendment to Schedule 14D-9, as if an amendment was not
required until there was certainty that a merger would occur.58 The
initial decision emphasized that the standard for determining the
materiality of an event is the degree of probability, not certainty,
balanced against the anticipated magnitude of the event. 59 Al-
though, Allied's original Schedule 14D-9 disclosed that the Board
had agreed "to continue to explore and investigate" alternatives to
the Campeau offer, this disclosure did not encompass the specific
negotiations that culminated in DeBartolo's all-cash offer of $67
million for all of Allied's shares.60
On October 3, 1986, Allied and DeBartolo had reached an
agreement in principle as a result of the ongoing merger negotia-
tions, with the contingency that DeBartolo obtain the requisite fi-
nancing. 61 On that same day, the Allied Board of Directors con-
vened and Kern presented the proposed merger.62 The minutes of
the meeting reveal that the Board adopted a resolution approving
the merger offer and recommending its ratification to Allied's
shareholders.6"
As mentioned before, the initial decision held that Allied's fil-
ing of Amendment No. 1 was days late in violation of Section
14(d)(4) of the Exchange Act."' Since Kern had sole responsibility
for determining when to file an amendment to Schedule 14D-9, he
was found to be the cause of Allied's noncompliance.65 Kern argued
that an amendment was unnecessary prior to October 8, in that
there was no agreement in principle until this date.66 In addition,
the board's resolution merely authorized Allied's officers to take ac-
tion when the financing condition had been met.67
To determine whether an "agreement in principle" had been
attained, the standard pronounced in Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 89,585-89,586.
60 Id. at 89,586.
01 Id.
62 Id.
68 Id. at 89,586-89,587.
" Id. at 89,587.
65 Id.
11 Respondent's Brief at 56, Kern (No. 1174).
*1 In re George C. Kern, Jr. [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
84,342, at 89,587.
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was applied." The Third Circuit in Greenfield held that an "agree-
ment in principle" is reached when would-be merger partners have
agreed on the price and structure of the transaction." It was Judge
Blair's opinion that the officers of both Allied and DeBartolo had
agreed as to the price and structure of the proposed merger as of
October 3.70 Kern's insistence that an agreement which would raise
a disclosure obligation had not been reached due to the absence of
the required financing was unpersuasive.71 The court reasoned that
to hold otherwise would permit parties to evade the disclosure re-
quirements of Section 14 by including a condition precedent into
their agreement, alleging that an agreement does not exist until
such condition is met.7" Disclosure would not occur until the "agree-
ment in principle became a fait accompli merger agreement."73
C. Standard of Culpability Under Section 15(c)(4)
The Commission may institute proceedings pursuant to Section
15(c)(4) against "any person who was a cause of the failure to com-
ply due to an act or omission the person knew or should have known
would contribute to the failure to comply.., with such provision or
such rule or regulation thereunder. 17 ' The Division argued that the
appropriate standard of care in this case was negligence, defined as
"the failure to exercise the standard of care required of a reasona-
ble, similarly situated person under the same facts and circum-
stances."17 5 On the other hand, counsel for Kern argued that the
phrase "knew or should have known" in Section 15(c)(4) required
that liability be imposed upon a showing of scienter, a higher level
of culpability.76
Judge Blair agreed with the Division, finding that "a showing
of negligence by a person contributing to a failure to comply is suffi-
8 d.
' Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 742 F.2d 751, 757 (3d Cir. 1984).
70 In re George C. Kern, Jr. [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
84,342, at 89,586.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 89,586-89,587.
73 Id. at 89,587-89,588.
7' Section 15(c)(4), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o(c)(4) (West Supp. 1991).
75 Memorandum of Law at 49, Kern (No. 1174).
76 Reply Brief of Respondent at 21, Kern (No. 1174).
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cient to satisfy the phrase 'should have known' in Section
15(c)(4). ' ' 77 His conclusion was based on a review of the legislative
history of Section 15(c)(4), the intent and purpose of which was to
provide a method of addressing in an expeditious manner accounting
and technical issues involving the disclosure provisions of the Ex-
change Act.7 8 The court reasoned that adopting a higher level of
culpability would contradict the statute's objective of being a quick
means of enforcing disclosure rules. 9 In addition, Judge Blair stated
that if Congress intended to impose a higher standard of culpability,
it would have employed language similar to statutes like
15(b)(4)(E), which includes the words "willfully aided, abetted,
counseled . . . the violation by any other persons." 80
D. Relief Under Section 15(c)(4)
The Division of Enforcement sought as part of the remedy an
"order directing Kern to comply or take steps to effect compliance
with Section 14(d)(4) of the Exchange Act and Rule 14d-9."' In
reply, counsel for Kern argued that the scope of the Commission's
authority under Section 15(c)(4) did not authorize the issuance of
orders directing future compliance in general terms.82
In the initial decision, the administrative court defined the
Commission's authority pursuant to Section 15(c)(4) by reviewing
the legislative history of the statute.8 Judge Blair concluded that
the Commission did have the authority to issue orders of future di-
rection, where appropriate.8" However, the court proceeded to hold
11 In re George C. Kern, Jr. [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
84,342, at 89,591.
S. Rep. No. 379, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 23-26 (1963).
In re George C. Kern, Jr. [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1
84,342, at 89,590. Under a higher standard, the Division would be required to prove that
Kern acted with knowledge of the illegality.
8o Id. at 89,592.
Si Post Hearing Memorandum at 69, Kern (No.1174).
a Brief of Respondent at 16-18, Kern (No. 1174).
s In re George C. Kern, Jr. [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
84,342, at 89,593.
Id. at 89,595.
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that there was no authority for the Commission to issue orders of
general compliance.8 5
Based on the facts of this case, the court reasoned it would be
an abuse of the Commission's authority to direct Kern to generally
ensure that any other regulated entity that Kern may represent in
the future would comply with the disclosure provisions of the Ex-
change Act."6 In addition, since Kern was no longer associated with
Allied and Allied had ceased to be a publicly traded corporation
subject to the disclosure provisions, an order directed at Kern as to
Allied's future compliance was inappropriate. 87 In closing, Judge
Blair ordered that the proceedings as to Kern be discontinued. 88
E. Commission's Review of the Initial Decision
On January 5, 1989, the Commission ordered on its own initia-
tive a review of all issues of fact and law that were advanced in the
administrative court's initial decision in Kern pursuant to Rule
17(c) of its Rules of Practice. 89 Thereafter, Kern also appealed the
lower court's decision. 90 The opinion of the Commission addressed
the sole issue of whether the scope of Section 15(c)(4) of the Ex-
change Act should be construed as providing for the issuance of
general future compliance orders.91 The Commission began its anal-
ysis by recognizing that the issuance of these types of orders under
Section 15(c)(4) was "a matter of first impression in an adjudicated
proceeding." 92 Finding that the language of the statute did not pro-
vide for the issuance of future compliance orders in general, the
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 89,596.
11 SEC Digest 89-3-01, 1989 WL 227217 (S.E.C.). Rule 17(c), 17 C.F.R.
§ 201.17(c) (1990), provides that " . .. [t]he Commission may on its own initiative order
review of any initial decision by a hearing officer within 30 days after the initial decision has
been served on all parties. .. "
" In re George C. Kern, Jr., [1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1
84,815 (June 21, 1991).
91 Id. at 82,004-82,005.
11 Id. at 82,005. In footnote four, the Commission stated that most of the Section
15(c)(4) proceedings have been settled by consent.
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court turned to the statute's legislative history for guidance. 93 While
the Congressional hearings surrounding the amendments to Section
15(c)(4) in 1984 may have been indicative of Congress' intent to
broaden the scope of the statute, the Commission also examined the
effect of Congress' action in the passage of the Securities Enforce-
ment Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990
("SERPSRA").94
In SERPSRA, Congress granted the Commission the authority
to issue orders against a violator or a cause of a violation "to cease
and desist from committing or causing such violation and any future
violation of the same provision, rule or regulation." '96 Nevertheless,
SERPSRA did not settle the issue in the case at hand, since this
legislation was enacted subsequent to the Commission's initial pro-
ceedings against Kern in 1987.96
The Commission's review of the nearly 100 proceedings insti-
tuted under Section 15(c)(4) evidenced a steady trend toward the
issuance of general future compliance orders as an administrative
remedy. 97 The first orders issued pursuant to a Section 15(c)(4) vio-
lation were of a corrective nature, followed by orders directed at
implementing procedures to prevent a recurring violation.98 Subse-
quently, orders requiring future compliance with the Exchange Act,
and orders directed at general future compliance emerged. 99
Referring to a summary of the use of Section 15(c)(4) outlined
in the legislative proposals to amend the statute in 1984, the court
recognized that Section 15(c)(4) was "primarily a means of compel-
ling issuers to correct false or inaccurate periodic reports." 100 The
Commission proceeded to hold that:
98 Id.
9, Pub. L. No. 101-429, 104 Stat 931 (1990).
Il In re George C. Kern, Jr., [1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
84,815 (June 21, 1991) at 82,007.
90 Id.
Id.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id. Citing SEC Oversight and Technical Amendments: Hearings on H.R. 4574
Before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection and Finance of the
House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 344 (1984).
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[i]n light of all the foregoing factors, we now believe that
the better view of the proper exercise of our authority, in
the context of the Commission's performance of its adjudi-
cative function in contested administrative proceedings, is
that we are and ought to be constrained from imposing or-
ders of general future compliance under Section
15(c)(4). 101
The Commission concluded its opinion by affirming only the
administrative law judge's order to discontinue the proceedings
against Kern.'02 None of the other issues raised in the initial deci-
sion were reviewed by the Commission.'0 "
IV. ANALYSIS
Who won? The appellate decision in Kern has received much
criticism from both sides represented in the debate. On the one
hand, legal practitioners in the securities industry contend that the
negligence standard of culpability applied by the administrative
court was erroneous, and that a higher standard like scienter should
have been employed. Moreover, since the Commission did not spe-
cifically affirm the lower court's findings as to this particular issue,
some securities attorneys may argue that the appropriate standard
for finding someone to be the "cause" of a violation pursuant to
Section 15(c)(4) is still an open question. 04
On the other hand, the Division of Enforcement of the SEC
was left with no suitable remedy or sanction to apply against Kern.
In affirming Judge Blair's position as to the narrow scope of Section
101 Id. at 82,008.
102 Id.
108 Id.
104 But see the Commission's standard of review in such proceedings outlined in Rule
17(d) of the Commission's Rules of Practice, 17 C.F.R. § 201.17(d) (1990), providing that
".. . the Commission may decline to review the initial decision except that it will order
review where . . . (2) [t]he petition for review makes reasonable showing that . . . (ii) [tihe
initial decision embodies (a) [a] finding or conclusion of material fact which is clearly erro-
neous; or (b) [a] legal conclusion which is erroneous..." Thus, the Commission's failure to
review Judge Blair's conclusion that Kern was the cause of Allied's disclosure violation,
implies that the lower court's findings of facts were not erroneous.
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15(c)(4), the Commission may have rendered this statute useless as
an enforcement tool.10 5
Nevertheless, the Kern decision provides attorneys, and other
professionals, with a valuable guide as to the scope of their obliga-
tions in complying with the disclosure provisions of the Exchange
Act. In determining whether a particular event requires disclosure,
Basic's probability/magnitude balancing test is applied, where the
large magnitude of an event may warrant disclosure in spite of a
small probability of its occurrence.' 0 6 Attorneys for Kern vigorously
argued that the Commission was attacking Kern's good faith legal
judgment, an area outside of the Commission's authority, in his de-
cisions to postpone disclosure.' 07 Both Judge Blair and the Commis-
sion were unpersuaded by these arguments, emphasizing Kern
"knew or should have known" that the omission would result in a
violation of the securities laws, 10 8 a primary area of concern in the
Commission's oversight functions.
Notably, the fact that Kern was also a director of Allied was
not a decisive factor in assessing Kern's culpability. More emphasis
was placed on Kern's discretionary authority to make all disclosure
decisions on behalf of his client. 0 9 Perhaps a narrow reading of the
SEC's ruling in Kern would find an attorney to be a "cause" of his
client's failure to comply with the disclosure provisions of the Ex-
change Act only where the attorney has discretionary authority for
such compliance. A broader construction of the initial decision
would apply the same standard of culpability to an attorney giving
legal advice to his client, where the client retains responsibility of
making the disclosure decisions.
'05 ABA Committee Discusses Kern Ruling, International-ization, SEC Amicus
Briefs, 20 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 46 at 1786.
I" In re George C. Kern, Jr. [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
84,342, at 89,583.
107 See Reply Brief of Respondent at 20, Kern (No. 1174), advocating a higher stan-
dard of culpability than negligence, where a good faith error would be free from liability.
See also Memorandum of Amicus Curiae, Association of the Bar of the City of New York,
arguing that such standard setting and regulation of the legal practice by the Commission
would have a "chilling effect on the necessary independence of counsel."
... In re George C. Kern, Jr. [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
84,342, at 89,591.
109 Id. at 89,592.
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The Commission clearly refused to adopt a "two-tiered stan-
dard for enforcement of Section 15(c)(4), one for the 'cause,' who
happens to be a lawyer, the other for a non-lawyer 'cause.' Such
distinction would be at odds with the statutory language of Section
15(c)(4) which calls to account any person, not just a non-lawyer,
who is a 'cause'.'110
In addition, the Commission stressed the importance of having
attorneys follow precedent established in prior administrative pro-
ceedings such as the Revlon"' case. " 2 In Revlon, the Commission
held that disclosure is required upon the commencement of substan-
tive discussions concerning a possible merger, irrespective of the fact
that negotiations are in preliminary stages." 3 Although the Revlon
decision was issued in a consent settlement action pursuant to Sec-
tion 15(c)(4) as opposed to a litigative proceeding like Kern, Judge
Blair opined that the decision "should have alerted Kern to the dis-
closure philosophy of the Commission.' 1 4
Kern's counsel was satisfied with the outcome of the case," 5
since proceedings against Kern were discontinued due to the Com-
mission's lack of authority in issuing prospective orders of compli-
ance." 6 However, securities attorneys should be cautious before re-
lying on a broad application of this ruling in Kern. The
Commission's reluctance to issue a general compliance order was
primarily due to the facts of this case. 17 By the time the Commis-
sion addressed the relief requested by the Division of Enforcement,
110 Id. at 89,592-89,593.
"' In re Revlon Inc., [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 84,006
(June 16, 1986).
"I In re George C. Kern, Jr. [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
84,342, at 89,593.
'13 In re Revlon Inc., [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 84,006
(June 16, 1986).
I" In re George C. Kern, Jr. [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T
84,342, at 89,593.
5 Barbara Franklin, "No Authority Found For Order in Kern Case," N.Y.L.J., June
24, 1991, at 1.
11 In re George C. Kern, Jr., [1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1
84,815 (June 21, 1991) at 82,008.
17 See the initial decision [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T
84,342, at 89,595, and the Commission's subsequent review [1991 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,815, at 82,008.
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Kern had no existing legal relationship with Allied,' which had
become a nonreporting company. Under these circumstances, there
would have been no purpose in requiring Kern to ensure that Allied
comply with the disclosure provisions of the Exchange Act in the
future.
Moreover, the Commission recognized that the new enforce-
ment remedies enacted in SERPSRA would authorize the Commis-
sion to issue general prospective cease and desist orders."' Had the
Kern case arisen after the SERPSRA legislation was effective, the
Commission would have issued an order against Kern "to cease and
desist from committing or causing such violation and any future vio-
lation of the same provision, rule or regulation."' 20 Consequently,
the Commission may replace the use of Section 15(c)(4) as an en-
forcement tool against attorneys with the use of the cease and desist
provisions of SERPSRA.
V. SCRUTINY OF ATTORNEY CONDUCT IN THE WAKE
OF KERN
Highly publicized alleged abuses by professionals have stimu-
lated action against accountants and lawyers by other regulatory
bodies. For instance, the Office of Thrift Supervision ("OTS") and
the Department of Justice recently sued the prominent law firm of
Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler ("Kaye, Scholer") and its
former managing partner for $275 million, freezing the firm's assets
for their role in representing a convicted savings and loan execu-
tive. 2 ' The OTS' temporary cease-and-desist order had never been
enforced against a law firm.'22
In the Notice of Charges, the OTS alleged that Kaye, Scholer's
actions constituted "reckless, unethical and improper professional
I" The merger was approved on October 8, 1986, and the initial decision in Kern is
issued on November 14, 1988.
I" In re George C. Kern, Jr., [1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 11
84,815 (June 21, 1991) at 82,007 (Commission states that "for the future, the passage of
SERPSRA renders moot the issue of the Commission's general power").
120 Id.
1 Stephen Labaton, U.S. Moves to Freeze Assets Of Law Firm for S. & L. Role,
THE NEw YORK TIMES, Mar. 2, 1992, at Al.
Stephanie B. Goldberg, Welcome to the New Uncertainty, A.B.A.J. 51, July, 1992.
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* conduct, reckless breaches of [the firm's] duty of loyalty and duty to
provide competent advice with due care, and demonstrated a lack of
the professional character and integrity necessary for an attorney to
practice before the OTS."'2 Specifically, the law firm was charged
with violating its duty to disclose material information about its cli-
ent's activities while responding to regulatory examinations of its
client.124 Kaye, Scholer was also charged with breaching its fiduci-
ary duty to its client by failing to advise the board of directors that
the owners of the financial institution were not acting in the bank's
best interest.' 5
In response, Kaye, Scholer agreed to settle the lawsuit for $41
million, and two former partners of the firm were permanently
barred from representing federally insured lending institutions,
while another former partner agreed not to make material omissions
in future dealings with the OTS.1'2 By issuing this cease-and-desist
order against one of the most prestigious law firms in New York,
the OTS sent a clear message to members of the legal and financial
community: lawyers will be treated like everyone else when its
comes to bank crimes. A lawyer's duty of vigorous advocacy does
not supersede his duty of care.
Another case that has had a major impact on attorney liability
in the securities industry is Lincoln Savings and Loan Association v.
Wall.1 7 In Lincoln, District Court Judge Stanley Sporkin raised the
following questions regarding professionals who advised officers and
directors of the bank on improper financial transactions leading to
the bank's insolvency:
Where were these professionals ... when these clearly im-
proper transactions were being consummated? Why didn't
any of them speak up or disassociate themselves from the
transactions? Where also were the outside accountants and
attorneys when these transactions were effectuated? What
is difficult to understand is that with all the professional
113 James Podgers, Changing the Rules, A.B.A.J. 53, 54 July, 1992.
124 Id. at 53-54.
135 Id. at 54.
126 Stephanie B. Goldberg, Welcome to the New Uncertainty, A.B.A.J. 51, at 51-52,
July, 1992.
127 Lincoln Savings and Loan Association v. Wall, 743 F.Supp. 901 (D.D.C. 1990).
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talent involved (both accounting and legal), why at least
one professional would not have blown the whistle to stop
the overreaching that took place in this case. 128
Specifically, the court criticized certain actions of private coun-
sel, such as engaging in dilatory practices with the bank's regulators
and preparing frivolous lawsuits.129 Judge Sporkin's comments may
have encouraged potential litigants in the savings and loan industry
to seek relief in the private sector.13 0 In line with an expected influx
of professional liability lawsuits,"' the Lincoln opinion alerts attor-
neys and accountants of the increased likelihood of being held ac-
countable to the general public when representing a public
company.
Ernst & Young, one of the accounting firms engaged by Lin-
coln Savings & Loan Association and a named defendant in a fed-
eral civil fraud lawsuit, recently agreed to settle for $63 million.3 2
A settlement of this magnitude may serve to remind accountants of
their potential liability in auditing public companies. In the future,
accountants may be subjected to a higher standard of care, as sug-
gested by Judge Sporkin's statement in Lincoln, that "accountants
must be particularly skeptical where a transaction has little or no
economic substance. This is so despite the fact that the transaction
might technically meet GAAP standards."'
These lawsuits may indicate an emerging trend toward regula-
tion of entities that file professional liability suits as a result of pres-
sures from regulators and the investing public. Administrative agen-
cies will be continuously challenged to maintain a proper balance
between their regulatory and enforcement functions.
12 Id. at 920.
12 Id. at 921.
10 Id. at 920.
"11 Mark I. Rosen, Deputy General Counsel for the Federal Depository Insurance
Corporation, stated that with regard to suits filed against attorneys and accountants,
"[w]hat's been filed now does not even come close to representing what's in the pipeline or
what may be happening in the future." Sontag, Two Twists to S&L Fallout, NAT'L L.,
Sept. 17, 1990, at 3.
100 Ernst & Young, law firm settle in Keating case, THE MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 31,
1992, at 3C.
18 Lincoln Savings and Loan Association v. Wall, 743 F.Supp. 901, 913 (D.D.C.
1990).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Commission's decision in Kern signalled its intention to
take a more active role in establishing and enforcing standards ap-
plicable to the legal profession. Kern not only provides guidance on
substantive issues pertaining to the disclosure provisions of the Ex-
change Act, but also establishes the principle that lawyers will be
subjected to the same standards applicable to other persons under
the securities laws. Regardless of an attorney's good faith legal
judgement, the Commission is going to measure the professional
conduct of an attorney by the same standard of "any person who
was a cause of the failure to comply" with Section 15(c)(4). Given
the SEC's expanded rule-making authority in SERPSRA, an in-
crease in litigation is expected.1""
As the obligations of a securities attorney have increased both
in number and complexity, the need for the Commission to define
what is expected of attorneys practicing before it has also increased.
The SEC should promulgate standards and provide more guidance
through no-action letters, special committee reviews, and educa-
tional literature, as it has done in the accounting profession. The
current method of defining standards through administrative pro-
ceedings and civil litigations, which can cause irreparable damage to
well meaning professionals, is not efficient. 135
Administrative agencies such as the SEC and the OTS should
prescribe clear standards of conduct of which professionals will have
advance notice, and resort to enforcement actions after a violation of
such standards has occurred. It would be unfair and ineffective to
134 SEC, Budget Estimate Fiscal 1992, at II-i (Feb. 4, 1991) ("it is expected that a
significant number of defendants and respondents who previously would have consented in
Commission proceedings will contest the Commission's allegations when monetary penalties
or other, new, forms of relief are sought").
135 Recent actions questioning attorney duties and liability under the federal securities
laws include: Schatz v. Rosenberg, Docket No. 91-1062, 943 F.2d 485 (1991) (Petition was
filed with the U. S. Supreme Court by sellers of companies against law firm that represented
the buyer to address attorney liability under the fraud provisions of the Exchange Act). SEC
v. Singer [Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 96,525 (SD NY) (Action
against an attorney for alleged insider trading after attorney's summary judgment motion
was denied). In re Nouskajian, Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 6923, 50 SEC Docket
(Jan. 16, 1992) (Rule 2(e) proceeding was instituted against an attorney selling unregistered
securities in the form of investment contracts).
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use a "create the rules as we go" approach and pursue disciplinary
actions against professionals without guidance on the rules.
An attorney representing a client in a regulated industry must
remember that the commitment entails a dual representation: to the
client and the government. Zealous representation of the client is
not the only focus of the relationship. Adherence to relevant govern-
ment regulations is also critical. Cases like Kaye, Scholer "raise dif-
ficult questions about how far a lawyer's advocacy can go before
crossing over the line from zeal to deception."' 3 This case, as well
as other recent actions by the SEC, suggest that the regulators are
likely to continually remind lawyers that practicing before the Com-
mission is a privilege, not a right.
Eloisa M. Delgado
136 Stephen Labaton, U.S. Moves to Freeze Assets Of Law Firm for S. & L. Role,
THE NEW YORK TIMES, Mar. 2, 1992, at Al.
